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In this note, we address nonparametric identification of a collective model of
household behavior in the presence of additive unobserved heterogeneity in the
sharing rule. We show that the (nonstochastic part of the) sharing rule is nonpara-
metrically identified. Moreover, under independence assumptions, individual En-
gel curves and the random distributions are identified except in special cases (i.e.,
linear Engel curves).
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1. Introduction
The empirical estimation of collective models of household behavior has attracted much
attention recently. In such models, agents have their own preferences and make Pareto
efficient decisions. The econometrician can observe the household’s (aggregate) de-
mand, but not individual consumptions. The issue, then, is whether this is sufficient
to identify individual demands and the decision process. Existing results distinguish
two basic cases, depending on whether or not data entail price variations. If they do,
Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) show that identification obtains under exclusion restric-
tions. Specifically, if for each agent there exists a commodity not consumed by that
agent,1 then generically each agent’s collective indirect utility (which gives the agent’s
utility as a function of prices and incomes) can be ordinally recovered. Alternatively,
Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori (2009; from now on BBC) consider the “cross
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1The choice of these “exclusive” goods plays a key role in empirical applications of the model. Two main
strands can be found in the literature. One refers to consumption goods that are known to be only con-
sumed by one person. For instance, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994) use male and
female clothing, while Attanasio and Lechene (2014) and Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) use data
on individual food consumption. Other studies, particularly those considering developing countries, may
use social norms that restrict consumption of some goods for some genders (e.g., tobacco is a mostly male
consumption in some countries). The second approach considers labor supply models and assumes that
each spouse’s leisure is the spouse’s private consumption. In what follows, we are mostly referring to the
first interpretation.
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sectional” case, in which prices are constant over the sample. Then household demand
depends only on income (or total expenditures) and on one or several distribution
factors—defined as variables that affect the decision process but not the budget con-
straint. In a framework where all commodities are privately consumed—or alternatively
where utilities are separable in private consumptions—efficiency is equivalent to the
existence of a “sharing rule” whereby income is split between spouses, who each in-
dependently purchase their preferred bundle. BBC show that, under similar exclusion
restrictions, individual Engel curves and the sharing rule can be recovered up to an ad-
ditive constant.
In practice, empirical estimation of cross sectional collective models considers











) + αi2(x− ρ(xz)) +ηi i = 3     n
Here, x denotes income or total expenditures, z dentes a distribution factor, and qi de-
notes the household demand for good i; note that goods 1 and 2 are exclusively con-
sumed by members 1 and 2, respectively. Moreover, ρ(xz) denotes the sharing rule, and
αix (x= 12) is member x’s Engel curve for commodity i. Finally, the ηs are independent
and identically distributed (iid) random shocks. This framework is used, for instance, by
Browning et al. (1994), Attanasio and Lechene (2014), and many others.
An obvious weakness of the framework just described lies in its treatment of unob-
served heterogeneity. Essentially, it is captured through the ηs, although the latter vari-
ables could (and, as we shall argue below, should) rather be interpreted as measurement
errors. But a formulation like (1) imposes that the sharing rule be identical across cou-
ples; in particular, unobserved heterogeneity cannot affect the distribution of income
within the household. In many contexts, the assumption may seem excessively restric-
tive. The intrahousehold decision process is typically complex and involves a host of
factors, some of which are not observed by the econometrician. In that case, one would
like to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision process itself. Moreover, the
extent to which (1) is compatible with heterogeneity in preferences is unclear, especially
in view of the recent literature using a random utilities framework.
The goal of this note is to investigate whether this setting can be extended while
preserving its main, identification properties. Specifically, we propose to replace model






x− ρ(xz)− ε) +η2 (2)
qi = αi1
(
ρ(xz)+ ε) + αi2(x− ρ(xz)− ε) +ηi
where the ηis are measurement errors and ε is a random shock reflecting unobserved
heterogeneity (so that the actual sharing rule is the sum of a deterministic component
ρ(xz) and the random shock ε).
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We start with a motivating example showing how the structure (2) naturally emerges
in specific economic problems; here, we consider the standard issue of efficient risk
sharing within a group. We then give our main results. We first show that ρ can be non-
parametrically identified in the neighborhood of any point (x̄ z̄) at which ∂ρ/∂z does
not vanish. This result is fully general; it does not require specific assumptions on the
joint distribution of shocks. We then consider a second problem, namely the identifi-
cation of individual Engel curves and of the distributions of ε and the ηs. The crucial
assumption here is that ε is independent of the shocks η1    ηn and these shocks are
independent of each other; this assumption is natural if the ηs are interpreted as mea-
surement errors. Under that assumption, we show that nonparametric identification ob-
tains except for particular cases (typically, when some of the individual Engel curves are
linear). Finally, all these results only require n ≥ 2; that is, the existence of two exclusive
goods is sufficient to get identification of the sharing rule, irrespective of the total num-
ber of commodities. For i ≥ 3, additional, overidentifying restrictions are generated.
To the best of our knowledge, this contribution is the first to allow for heterogeneous
sharing rules to identify Engel curves for each commodity and each member. Standard
methods in the existing literature, including Browning et al. (1994) and Attanasio and
Lechene (2014), require sharing rules to be deterministic in identifying individual Engel
curves. Matzkin and Perez-Estrada (2011) discuss a novel result about identifying indi-
vidual random utility functions in collective models. In their setting, which postulates
only one private good and a composite good, each agent’s consumption for the private
good is identified as a sharing rule. Unfortunately, their result is not directly applicable
to general collective models with multiple private goods, which we consider here.
Our work is related to but in several dimensions distinctly different from Matzkin
and Perez-Estrada (2011) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2015). To focus on preference het-
erogeneity, Matzkin and Perez-Estrada (2011) assume that the bargaining power be-
tween agents is deterministic, while our method can allow unobserved heterogeneity in
the bargaining power as well as in each agent’s preference. Also, since their model postu-
lates one private good, for the case where there are multiple private goods it implies that
each individual’s utility is a function of the total sum of the private goods consumed.
Thus, their method can identify only sharing rules but not individual Engel curves for
each good, while our method can identify both. Lewbel and Pendakur (2015) propose a
new identification result for nonlinear demand systems using random coefficients mod-
els. Even though they also focus on unobserved preference heterogeneity, their result is
only for the unitary model and not directly applicable to the collective model that is
considered here.
The characteristic function method plays a key role in the first stage of identifying
Engel curves and the distribution of shocks. This method has been widely used in the
literature on stochastic deconvolution such as Evdokimov (2010), Evdokimov and White
(2012), Bonhomme and Robin (2010), Arellano and Bonhomme (2012), and Schennach
and Hu (2013), to name a few.2 In particular, Schennach and Hu (2013) demonstrate
2Evdokimov (2010) and Arellano and Bonhomme (2012) take this approach to identify panel data mod-
els, and Bonhomme and Robin (2010) apply this method to linear factor models to decompose individual
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that identifying a model with measurement errors in both dependent and independent
variables can be viewed as a problem of the existence of two observationally equivalent
models, one having errors only in the dependent variable and the other having errors
only in independent variables. By extending their result to our model (2), we derive suffi-
cient conditions for identification from more tractable models. Our identification result
shows that the structure of the collective model allows for weaker conditions compared
to the errors-in-variables models discussed in Schennach and Hu (2013).
Our proposed methods are also tied to the techniques used in the literature on iden-
tification of transformation models and of average derivative models. The transforma-
tion model is a particular case of the equation for q1 in (2), where η1 = 0 with probability
1. Chiappori, Komunjer, and Kristensen (2014) use partial derivatives of the distribution
function of the observables to identify the functions α1 and ρ for the transformation
model, while we make use of average derivatives of individual demand functions in the
presence of mean zero random shocks η1    ηn to consider the system of (2). The
literature on average derivative models has focused on general nonseparable models
Y = m(Xε), where X ∈ RK and ε ∈ RJ for K × J ∈ R2. Altonji and Matzkin (2005) show
that the average derivative ∂∂xE[Y | X = x] is identified when X and ε are independent
conditionally on other observable variables. We show that in our collective models (2),
the function ρ is identified up to an additive constant from average partial derivatives
∂
∂xE[qi | xz] and ∂∂zE[qi | xz] for i = 12.
2. A motivating example
The form (2) fits several frameworks that have recently attracted much interest. In this
section, we focus on the literature on efficient risk sharing, starting with Townsend’s
(1994) seminal paper.3 In Townsend’s framework, agents are characterized by constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences and share some exogenous income risk. If, for
expositional simplicity, we only consider two person households, then, by a standard
result of the collective literature,4 any efficient intrahousehold allocation mechanism
can be described as a two stage process. In the first stage, individuals agree on a sharing
rule that defines how total income x will be split between them; in the second stage,
and once income has been realized, members each choose their private consumption
conditional on the ex post budget constraint defined by the sharing rule. If ρ(x) denotes
the amount received by member 1 (so that 2 gets x− ρ), ex post utilities are
u1 = V̄ 1(ρ(x)) u2 = V̄ 2(x− ρ(x))
earnings into permanent and transitory components. Schennach and Hu (2013) rely on characteristic func-
tions to show that the nonparametric classical nonlinear errors-in-variables model is identified except for
a few particular parametric families.
3See also Cochrane (1991), Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), Duflo and Udry (2004), and Chiappori,
Samphantharak, Townsend, and Schuhlofer-Wohl (2014) among many others.
4See, for instance, Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014).
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) +μE(V̄ 2(x− ρ))





) = μV̄ 2′(x− ρ(x))
With CARA preferences, V̄ i(t) = −exp(−σit) and we have
σ1 exp(−σ1ρ) = μσ2 exp
(−σ2(x− ρ))
Therefore,
ρ(x) = − 1






σ1 + σ2x (3)
We can now introduce heterogeneity in this framework in two complementary ways.
First, the Pareto weight μ is the outcome of some ex ante bargaining process. Following
a standard, collective approach, we do not explicitly specify that process; however, we
assume that there exist some distribution factors (z1     zn) that may influence the pro-
cess and, therefore, the Pareto weight μ. The key remark here is that some (and possibly
most) of these factors may be unobservable. Specifically, assume that z1 = z is observ-
able whereas (z2     zn) are not,5 and that μ is multiplicatively separable,
μ= μ(z)γ(z2     zn) (4)
for some function γ. We see that the unobservable distribution factors create unob-
served heterogeneity in the Pareto weight, since observationally identical households
will typically exhibit different μ. As usual, we shall treat γ(z2     zn) as a random term.
Second, we can introduce some unobserved heterogeneity in preferences; specifi-
cally, we borrow from the random utility literature by assuming that
V i(t) = εiV̄ i(t) = −εi exp(−σit)
where εi represents a shock affecting i’s preferences. The first order conditions are now
ε1σ1 exp(−σ1ρ) = μ(z)γ(z2     zn)ε2σ2 exp
(−σ2(x− ρ))
5The extension to several observable distribution factors is straightforward and generates additional,
testable restrictions; essentially, the ratio of the partial effect of two distribution factors on the demand
for commodity i does not depend on i. This “factor proportionality” property has been tested empirically
in many contexts. See Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori (2009) and Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss
(2014) for a detailed presentation of different tests, and see Attanasio and Lechene (2014) for a recent ap-
plication.
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Therefore,
ρ(xz) = − 1






σ1 + σ2 lnμ(z)+
σ2
σ1 + σ2x (5)
= ρ̄(x z)+ ε (6)
where
ρ̄(x z) = − 1
σ1 + σ2 lnμ(z)+
σ2
σ1 + σ2x
and ε = − 1






Finally, individual demands for the various goods solve an ex post utility maximiza-
tion problem




where ρ1 = ρ and ρ2 = x− ρ. The form (2) directly follows.
The previous setting can be generalized in different directions. One may consider
a dynamic version, in which, at each period, agents allocate their current income be-
tween consumption and savings. This choice is made in the first stage; the second stage
remains unchanged, but x is now interpreted as total expenditures over the period. Sec-
ond, in the presence of public and private consumption, the two stage representation
still holds, but first stage decisions now entail both the choice of public consumptions
and the splitting of remaining income between members, to be allocated for private
consumptions. Again, the second stage remains unchanged, with two twists: first, x is
now the total amount spent on private consumptions by both members; second, the
demands for private goods should now be conditional on the level of public expendi-
tures (instrumented, for instance, by their price), although this conditioning disappears
if one is willing to assume that preferences are separable between private and public
consumptions.
In this example, the various types of unobserved heterogeneity—random prefer-
ences and unobserved distribution factors—are fully summarized by one random fac-
tor ε. While this property is clearly specific to the particular context, the example still
suggests that the case under consideration is not without economic relevance.
3. Identifying the sharing rule
Define conditional expected consumptions in the usual way:




ρ(xz)+ ε) | xz]




x− ρ(xz)− ε) | xz]
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and, for i ≥ 3,
Qi(xz) = E[qi | xz]
= E[αi1(ρ(xz)+ ε) | xz]
+E[αi2(x− ρ(xz)− ε) | xz]
We will make use of the following assumption in our analysis.
Assumption 1. The function Qi is C1 for i = 1     n.
Assumption 2. For all i, the complement of the set of points at which ∂Qi/∂x and ∂Qi/∂z
vanish is an open, dense subset.
Our first result is the following.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Pick any point (x̄ z̄) such that
∂Qi/∂z(x̄ z̄) = 0 for i = 12 (implying that ∂ρ/∂z(x̄ z̄) = 0). Then there exists an open




















































= −1 − ∂ρ/∂x
∂ρ/∂z
 (8)


















































which gives a partial differential equation in Q1 and Q2. 
Note that identification obtains from the observation of only two demands, corre-
sponding to the two exclusive goods. Other demands generate additional overidentify-
ing restrictions, as stated by the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then for some open neighbor-
hood V of (x̄ z̄) such that ∂Qi/∂z(x̄ z̄) = 0 for all i, there exists a set of overidentifying
restrictions, which take the form of a system of partial differential equations (PDEs) that















































For the proof, see the Appendix.
Finally, it should be stressed that, in line with the entire collective literature, the iden-
tification of the sharing rule obtains only up to an additive constant. As is well known,
the constant is welfare irrelevant; therefore, if one is interested in welfare-relevant is-
sues, the constant may with no loss of generality be normalized to be zero. We adopt
this normalization in what follows and, therefore, assume that ρ is a known function of
(x z). Note, however, that there are issues (e.g., measures of intrahousehold inequality
in consumptions) for which the constant would be relevant.
An important remark, at that point, is that the identification result just derived cru-
cially depends on the additive separability of the error term ε in the sharing rule. In-
deed, this assumption implies that the ratio ∂ρ/∂x∂ρ/∂z does not depend on the realization
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of ε, which leads to a simple identification argument whereby ρ is defined by two non-
stochastic PDEs. Whether this result extends to more general forms—and in particular
to a nonseparable structure of the type ρ(xzε)—is an open (and difficult) question.
4. Identifying the αs and the distributions
We now consider the second problem, namely the identification of individual Engel
curves and the distributions of the shocks. We will need the following assumptions.
Assumption 3. The random shocks εη1    ηn are mutually independent, indepen-
dent of expenditures and distribution factors, and E[ηk] = 0 for k= 1     n.
Assumption 4. The term E[exp{isηk}] does not vanish for any s ∈ R and k = 1     n,
where i = √−1.
Assumption 5. The marginal distributions of ε and ηk for k = 1     n, admit strictly
positive, finite, and differentiable density functions fe and fηk , respectively, with respect
to Lebesgue measure on R.
Assumption 6. The functions α1(·) and α2(·) are strictly increasing and three times dif-
ferentiable. Their first derivatives are finite and nonvanishing.
The linear case
We start with a very particular case, namely, linearity. One can readily see that, in that
case, full identification cannot obtain. Assume, for instance, that α1 and α2 are linear:
αi(t) =mit + ni
The two equations become
q1 =m1ρ(xz)+m1ε+ n1 +η1
q2 =m2x−m2ρ(xz)−m2ε+ n2 +η2
In that case, the constants m1 and m2 are identified from the knowledge of ρ. However,
there is no hope to recover the distributions of ε, η1, and η2.
However, the linear case is highly peculiar, and linear models tend to be systemat-
ically rejected by the data; in practice, linear demands are no longer used in the em-
pirical literature on demand systems, and were actually never used in the estimation of
collective models. Actual estimations mostly use either the almost ideal demand system
(AIDS), introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), in which budget shares are linear
in log income (the so-called price-independent generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG) form,
so that, in our notation, qi would be a function of x and x lnx), or the quadratic exten-
sion proposed by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997), which adds a term in x(lnx)2. For
instance, Browning and Chiappori (1998), Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013), and
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Attanasio and Lechene (2014) use a quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS)
form, whereas Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2012) and Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pen-
dakur (2013) refer to an AIDS framework.6
The general case
We now consider the general case. The main result, then, is the following.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1–6 hold and that there exist four C2 func-
tions (α1α2 ᾱ1 ᾱ2) and six random variables (εη1η2 ε̄ η̄1 η̄2) such that the random
variables (q1 q2) and (q̄1 q̄2), where




q2(x z) = α2
(
x− ρ(xz)− ε) +η2
and
q̄1(x z) = ᾱ1
(
ρ(xz)+ ε̄) + η̄1
(10)
q̄2(x z) = ᾱ2
(
x− ρ(xz)− ε̄) + η̄2
have the same distribution for all (x z) ∈ V , where V is some open neighborhood of (x̄ z̄)
such that ∂Qi/∂z(x̄ z̄) = 0 for all i. Then either α1 = ᾱ1 and α2 = ᾱ2 or α1, α2, ᾱ1 and α2
are linear .
The detailed proof is given in the Appendix. Here we provide a sketch of the proof.
Note, first, that the result is local; as such, the only assumption needed on the support
of the conditioning variables is that it contains the neighborhood under consideration.
Our proof consists of two steps. In the first step, we show that our identification prob-
lem can reduce to considering two observationally equivalent systems, one having no
η1 and the other having no η2 We then in the second step derive a sufficient condi-
tion for identification of the reduced models. Our result and proof in the first step are
similar to Schennach and Hu (2013), while those in our second step are different. Note
that our model is a system consisting of two equations of q1 and q2 each of which in-
volves an unknown Engel curve, while Schennach and Hu (2013) consider a single equa-
tion. Technically, our second step formulates differential equations from the joint dis-
tribution function of the household demand using change of variables. We find that our
sufficient condition for identification, which requires nonlinearity of individual Engel
curves, is weaker than theirs due to the more intricate structure of the collective model
than the errors-in-variables models in Schennach and Hu (2013).
6Other nonlinear forms can, however, be found in the literature. For instance, Browning et al. (1994) use
a log-quadratic demand function. See Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014) for an overview.
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5. Conclusion
Much work remains to be done. Our key assumptions for identification, including ad-
ditivity and mutual independence of unobserved heterogeneity terms, are restrictive. It
would be important for wider applicability to relax these assumptions or to develop an
alternative framework that does not rely on these assumptions. One possibility is using a
random coefficient model to capture the general heterogeneity. An interesting approach
would be to extend the result of Lewbel and Pendakur (2015) to collective models, which
consider generalized random coefficient models for unitary models. We leave this work
for future research.
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x− ρ(xz)− ε) | xz]
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Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is in two stages.
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Stage 1. Note, first, that since ρ is known, we change variables and consider (ρ y) in-
stead of (x z), where y = x− ρ.
The first stage is similar to Schennach and Hu (2013). Consider the four models
M1:
q1 = α1(ρ+ ε)+η1
q2 = α2(y − ε)+η2
M2:
q1 = ᾱ1(ρ+ ε̄)+ η̄1
q2 = ᾱ2(y − ε̄)+ η̄2
and
M3:
q1 = α1(ρ+ ε)+ η̃1
q2 = α2(y − ε)
M4:
q1 = ᾱ1(ρ+ ε̄)
q2 = ᾱ2(y − ε̄)+ η̃2
where all random variables are mutually independent.
Lemma 1. There exist two distinct observationally equivalent models M1 and M2 if and
only if there exist two distinct observationally equivalent models M3 and M4.
Proof. As in Schennach and Hu (2013), the joint characteristic functions (q1q2)(s1 s2)
of q1 and q2 are written in M1 and M2 as follows: under M1,








































to be the characteristic functions of η̃1 in M3 and of η̃2 in M4,
respectively; therefore, the conclusion. 
Stage 2. We now show that if α1 = ᾱ1 and α2 = ᾱ2, M3 and M4 cannot be observation-
ally equivalent unless the αs are linear.
Noting that the joint distribution of q1 and q2 is the same under M3 and M4, for any
(t1 t2) ∈R2, start with
G(t1 t2 yρ) = Pr
[
α1(ρ+ ε)+ η̃1 ≤ t1α2(y − ε)≤ t2
]
= Pr[ᾱ1(ρ+ ε̄)≤ t1 ᾱ2(y − ε̄)+ η̃2 ≤ t2]
Here the function G is not necessarily observed. Let ai be the inverse of αi. We first have
that
G(t1 t2 yρ) = Pr
[
α1(ρ+ ε)+ η̃1 ≤ t1 y − ε ≤ a2(t2)
]
























G(t1 t2 yρ) = Pr
[
ᾱ1(ρ+ ε̄)≤ t1 ᾱ2(y − ε̄)+ η̃2 ≤ t2
]
























































where the first expression depends on y − a2(t2) and the second depends on ρ− ā1(t1).
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Define




Then from (12), there exist functions B and C such that (s.t.)
A(t1 t2 yρ) = B
(
t1 y − a2(t2)ρ
)
and





Therefore, there exist a function D s.t.
A(t1 t2 yρ) = D
(




T = ā1(t1)− ρ
Y = y − a2(t2)
Also, note that
a2(t2)= y −Y ⇒ t2 = α2(y −Y)
so that
D(TY) = ᾱ′2(y − T)fη̃2
(
t2 − ᾱ2(y − T)
)
fe(T)
= ᾱ′2(y − T)fη̃2
(
α2(y −Y)− ᾱ2(y − T)
)
fe(T)
If we consider the change in variable
(t1 t2 yρ) → (YT yρ)
then the function D only depends on (YT),
∂D(TY)
∂y









0 = ᾱ′′2(y − T)fη̃2
(
α2(y −Y)− ᾱ2(y − T)
)
+ ᾱ′2(y − T)
(




α2(y −Y)− ᾱ2(y − T)
)

At any point where fη̄2 does not vanish,
f ′̃η2
(




α2(y −Y)− ᾱ2(y − T)
) = − ᾱ′′2(y − T)
ᾱ′2(y − T)
1
α′2(y −Y)− ᾱ′2(y − T)















u= y −Y = a2(t2)















) = − ᾱ′′2(v)
ᾱ′2(v)











and we can eliminate α′2(u) between these equations,


























for some constants K and L. This ordinary differential equation has two types of solu-







where K′ is an integration constant, and thus ᾱ2 is linear.
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1 − leLv) + k′ (15)
for some parameters k, l, L, and k′.
Now, if the αs are linear, M3 and M4 are obviously observationally equivalent:
q1 = α1ρ+ α1ε+ η̃1
q2 = α2y − α2ε
and
q1 = ᾱ1ρ+ ᾱ1ε̄
q2 = ᾱ2y − ᾱ2ε̄+ η̃2











φ2 =φ′ − kφ
which gives either φ = 0 or
φ(X) = k
Ce−kX − 1 





defines fη̄2 up to two integration constants. Finally, (13) gives
k




































1 − leLv) − k′)) − 1))/dv





e−CL − l) = e−kα2(u)
implying that α2(u) is constant, a contradiction.
We conclude that M3 and M4 cannot be observationally equivalent unless the αs are
linear. 
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